Issue yourself a credential.
Each entry produces a real openid-credential-offer:// URI over OpenID4VCI, and the credential is bound to a key your wallet proves it holds — so nobody else can present it. Four of the five are meant to be refused.
Everything here is synthetic: one invented persona, signed by a key published in this repository. The point is not the claims, it is what your verifier does with them.
On the mDL entries. The mDL entries are built to the ISO/IEC 18013-5 second-edition CD ballot resolution draft (v4, dated 2025-09-14), because that is the document this project holds and has read. The published 2021 first edition is what deployed verifiers implement, and the second edition renumbers clauses and changes substance. Where the two differ, these credentials follow the draft — so if your verifier disagrees with one, check the edition before you check your code.
- Person Identification Datadc+sd-jwt
a conformant verifier Accept it. This is the happy path, and the only entry here that is one.
generated/pid-complete
- PID · your own detailsdc+sd-jwt
a conformant verifier Accept it. Built exactly like the PID above — only the person differs, and the portrait and issuing authority stay synthetic so it still reads as a test specimen.
generated/pid-complete
- PID · revoked after 2 minutesdc+sd-jwt
a conformant verifier Accept it for its first two minutes; refuse it after. Token Status List §8.3: a verifier fetches the list the credential names and reads its entry — revoked means refuse. A verifier that still accepts it later either never checks status, or caches the list past its 30-second ttl.
generated/pid-complete
- PID · missing a mandatory attributedc+sd-jwt
a conformant verifier Refuse it, or refuse to treat it as a PID. CIR 2024/2977 makes birthdate mandatory, so a credential without one is not a conformant PID however well-formed it is.
generated/pid-missing-mandatory
- PID · expireddc+sd-jwt
a conformant verifier Refuse it. The signature verifies and every disclosure matches — the only thing wrong is the clock, which is exactly why a verifier that forgets to check exp passes this.
generated/pid-expired
- PID · signed by the wrong keydc+sd-jwt
a conformant verifier Refuse it. The key is generated per request and discarded, so nothing can resolve it — and it carries no x5c, because a certificate would assert a signer it does not have.
generated/pid-wrong-key
- PID · tampered after issuancedc+sd-jwt
a conformant verifier Refuse it — and not as a signature failure. The issuer's signature still verifies, because it covers the digests rather than the values behind them. RFC 9901 §7.1 step 5: a disclosure matching no digest means the credential MUST be rejected. A verifier that reports this as a bad signature has conflated two independent layers.
generated/pid-tampered
- Mobile Driving Licencemso_mdoc
a conformant verifier Accept it. The MSO is signed as an untagged COSE_Sign1 over a Sig_structure, every element digest covers its own IssuerSignedItemBytes, and the credential is bound to the key your wallet proved. This is the mdoc happy path.
generated/mdl-complete
second-edition CD draft, not the published 2021 edition
- mDL · missing a mandatory elementmso_mdoc
a conformant verifier Refuse it, or refuse to treat it as an mDL. Table 20 marks driving_privileges M, and a licence that grants no categories is the one element an mDL cannot be without. Note the structure is otherwise flawless — a verifier checking only the COSE signature accepts it.
generated/mdl-missing-mandatory
second-edition CD draft, not the published 2021 edition
- mDL · expiredmso_mdoc
a conformant verifier Refuse it. §12.3.4: the mdoc cannot be validated after validUntil. The signature verifies and every digest matches — the only thing wrong is the clock, and the timestamp lives inside the signed MSO rather than in a JWT claim, which is a different place to look.
generated/mdl-expired
second-edition CD draft, not the published 2021 edition
- mDL · tampered after issuancemso_mdoc
a conformant verifier Refuse it — and not as a signature failure. The issuer's signature over the MSO still verifies, because it covers digests rather than values. §12.3.5 requires each element to be digested over its IssuerSignedItemBytes, and this one no longer matches. A verifier that checks the COSE signature and stops accepts a forged name.
generated/mdl-tampered
second-edition CD draft, not the published 2021 edition
- mDL · signed by the wrong keymso_mdoc
a conformant verifier Refuse it. The key is generated per request and discarded, and the IssuerAuth carries no x5chain — §12.3.4 requires one, so there is nothing for a verifier to build a chain from.
generated/mdl-wrong-key
second-edition CD draft, not the published 2021 edition